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Old Dominion University 
Dale Townshend’s ambitious study, The Orders of Gothic: Foucault, Lacan, 
and the Subject of Gothic Writing 1764–1820 (AMS, 2007), undertakes to 
analyze British Gothic literature from 1764 to 1820, Michel Foucault’s 
genealogy of modernity, and psychoanalytic theory as related and mutually 
illuminating discourses. Adopting the Borromean knot (by which Jacques 
Lacan characterizes the interactions of the Imaginary, Symbolic, and the 
Real), as a figure for the interactions of the three discourses (6), Townshend 
argues that Gothic writing attests to the fact that “[i]n order to account for the 
complex relations of Gothic to modernity, Foucauldian new historicism needs 
a Lacanian supplement” (319; cf. 11). More specifically, Orders of Gothic 
argues that Lacanian theory provides “a point of critical purchase” (10) upon 
the persistence into modernity of residues of the previous “classical” regime, 
residues which without a Lacanian supplement “are largely inaccessible, even 
‘invisible’ to Foucault’s new historicist mode” (10–11) because of Foucault’s 
stress on epochal rupture, but that Gothic writing pervasively registers these 
residues, even as it participates in the deployment of modern subjectivity and 
Panoptical discipline that Foucault describes. 
In pursuit of this thesis, Townshend offers cogent summaries of Foucault’s 
Order of Things, Discipline and Punish, and History of Sexuality, as well as of 
psychoanalytic theory from Sigmund Freud through Lacan to Slavoj Žižek and 
Joan Copjec, and his engagement with Gothic criticism is comprehensive. 
Interpreting a wide array of Gothic texts ranging from the canonical to the 
relatively obscure, he moreover invokes an impressive body of eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century aesthetic and political theory. This bracing array of 
sources and conceptual frames produces intriguing and often revisionist 
readings of Gothic literature and makes strong cases both for the ways that 
Gothic literature anticipates and prepares for psychoanalytic theory, and for 
the ways that Gothic literature at once illustrates and problematizes Foucault’s 
account of the shift from a “classical” age centered in blood alliance and the 
sovereign power to punish bodies toward a modern one based in sexuality and 
Panoptical discipline. But even though Townshend denies privileging 
psychoanalytic theory over historicism (11), too often psychoanalytic theory 
functions more as the hand tying his Borromean knot than a thread within it, 
as psychoanalytic concepts are repeatedly used to describe Gothic writing, 
which—thus constituted in psychoanalytic terms—almost inevitably becomes 
“historical” evidence that Foucault’s historicism misses something in Gothics 
that psychoanalytic theory captures. Orders of Gothic also suffers from 
singularly poor copy-editing by AMS Press, with chapter 3 containing two 
section iii’s (126 and 134) and with far too many typos and syntactic errors 
marring Townshend’s already conceptually dense prose.[1] 
Townshend’s introduction sets forth his thesis, noting that while Foucault 
discusses the Gothic in his accounts of modernity’s advent, Lacan says little 
about the Gothic, and moreover admitting that Foucault and Lacan are 
“strange bedfellows” (11), given Foucault’s disavowals of psychoanalysis. 
Citing Robert Miles’s Gothic Writing 1750–1820: A Geneaology and my own 
Accidental Migrations: An Archaeology of Gothic Discourse as instances of 
Foucauldian historicism on the Gothic, he focuses upon Miles’s question of 
whether or not imaginative literature can or should be interpreted as 
discursive, ultimately positing (much like Miles) that while literature 
participates in discursivity, its aesthetic aspects reconfigure discursive 
material in ways that make psychoanalytic reading of the Gothic pertinent to 
historicism (5–6). 
Chapter 1 uses the Gothic to articulate psychoanalytic theory with Foucault’s 
historicist claim in The Order of Things that modernity invented “man” as a 
“doublet” who is characterized by three “categories” of paradox (22). First, 
Townshend argues that, much as for Foucault, man at once transcends history 
and is “empirically” subject to historical description, Gothics initially 
naturalize the transcendent moral traits of their protagonists but then 
narratively predicate this transcendent moral character upon the “empirical” 
discovery of “the constitutive events” of their pasts, in ways that echo the 
paradox by which Freud at once naturalizes universal drives and treats 
patients by recovering their individual histories (26). Second, much as for 
Foucault, the conscious, Cartesian cogito assumes and is shadowed by an 
unthought whose pursuit yields truth, in the Gothic dreams and the narrative 
architecture of clues and traces (such as found manuscripts or portraits) are 
privileged sites of truth, although in Gothics these secrets are in fact not 
hidden or unthinkable but “exist in a series of relatively undisguised forms” on 
the surface of the texts, much as the Other for Lacan is an effect of the 
Symbolic rather than the inaccessible other of the Imaginary and Real (35). 
Third, much as for Foucault, modernity sees origins as both constitutive and 
elusive, even though Gothics are obsessed with “empirically” discovering the 
“constitutive” past of protagonists (26), when this past is revealed it replaces 
the false past with which the protagonists began, and in ways that echo 
Freud’s reading of events such as the primal scene or incest both as 
constitutive and as imaginary constructs rather than true memory (44–45). 
Chapter 2 then reads Walpole’s Castle of Otranto and Mysterious Mother as 
instances of three “caveats” raised by the Gothic to Foucault’s account in The 
History of Sexuality of the transition from the classical age’s regime of blood 
alliance to the modern regime of sexuality. The first of these caveats argues, 
against Miles and other critics, that the shift from alliance to sexuality in 
Gothics is “a thoroughly paternal affair” (56), aligning Walpole’s 
representation of paternity with Lacan’s argument that the Symbolic order’s 
institution of the Name of the Father replaces biological fathers with Symbolic 
ones defined by the Law that they decree and embody, as evidenced for 
example by the fact that in Otranto Manfred—whose attempt to manipulate 
marriage for political purposes marks him as the Symbolic father of blood 
alliance—is supplanted by Jerome, Frederic, and the ghost of Alfonso—whose 
privileging of sensibility over politics marks them as Symbolic fathers of 
sexuality. Townshend’s second caveat reiterates his critique of Foucault’s 
stress upon historical rupture, arguing that Gothics represent the shift from 
blood alliance to sexual affinity as “fraught” and “conflictual” in ways that 
challenge Foucault’s (alleged) view that sexuality superimposed itself over the 
family and other institutions that had previously deployed alliance in “a 
relation of cooperation, exchange and harmonious co-existence” (77). Third, 
Townshend argues that in the Gothic, the modern subjects of sexuality are 
associated with the love privileged by sentimentality and sensibility rather 
than with sexuality per se, which on the contrary is polemically linked to the 
perversions of paternal subjects of alliance like Manfred in Otranto. 
The next three chapters pursue the thesis that conflict among Lacan’s 
Symbolic fathers in Gothics stages the fraught transition from Foucault’s 
alliance to sexuality, incorporating later Gothics from Ann Radcliffe to Mary 
Shelley, but also placing Gothics’ representation of paternity in context of 
contemporary discourses about political authority, education, marriage, and 
incest, as well as in context of further psychoanalytic concepts. Focusing on 
John Locke’s critique in Two Treatises of Government (1689) of Robert 
Filmer’s monarchist Patriarcha (1680), chapter 3 stresses how the Gothic 
fathers of alliance register Locke’s critique of Filmer’s attempt to conflate 
domestic and political authority, while the fathers of sexuality in Gothics 
register the debate started by Locke in his critique of Filmer, but taken up by 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, William Godwin, Mary Wollstonecraft, and Sarah 
Trimmer, about whether fathers, as rulers of the domestic sphere, should 
privilege reason or imagination in the education of their children. Taking 
Frankenstein as “the logical point of culmination” for “the Gothic tradition 
that runs from Walpole through Reeve and Lee, and into Radcliffe, Roche, and 
others in the 1790s and beyond” (134), Townshend argues that Shelley’s novel 
epitomizes how this tradition discredits the competing “paternal regimes 
advanced by Filmer, Locke, and Rousseau” and ultimately offers only a 
“threadbare . . . mythological discourse on fatherhood which can safely assert 
little more than the father’s necessary prohibition of incest” (155). Although 
the chapter provides intriguing historical context beyond Foucault and Lacan 
for Gothics’ representation of paternity, it often strains plausibility, as in the 
claims that “Locke . . . appears to be a late seventeenth-century version of 
Lacan’s paternal metaphor” (111) and that Maria Edgeworth’s Castle Rackrent 
is “a quasi-Gothic romance” exploiting “the trope of the tyrannous father” 
(129). 
Chapters 4 and 5 shift from situating Gothic representations of paternity 
within contemporaneous discourses to arguing for the ways they anticipate 
Freudian/Lacanian theories of incest and Lacanian/Žižekian theories of 
jouissance, extimacy, and phantasy. The second section of chapter 4 does 
make the keen historicist point that incest law in the eighteenth century was 
implausibly broad—prohibiting marriage between affines as well as blood 
relatives because it originated in Catholic ecclesiastical rather than British civil 
law—and that it was (therefore) implicated in Britain’s polemic definition of 
itself as Protestant rather than Catholic in ways that Linda Colley has stressed 
(179–83; cf. 226–30). However, by arguing that this legal definition of incest 
“seems to present Gothic writing with a certain difficulty . . . given that the 
Gothic, almost by definition, deals in families, both nuclear and extended, who 
are either unknown, lost, prohibited, or greatly damaged and disfigured” 
(183), Townshend oddly displaces this context as irrelevant to the Gothic, 
whose representation of incest is instead interpreted as anticipating 
Freudian/Lacanian theory in ways that implicitly naturalize psychoanalytic 
theory as a more valid historical context for Gothic views of incest than the 
historically contemporaneous discourses about incest that Townshend so 
cogently summarizes, only to minimize. 
Chapter 5 argues that Gothics install the regulated, monogamous, Protestant 
subject of sexuality in part by staging perverse fathers like Ambrosio in 
Matthew Lewis’s The Monk as a negative image of this normative subject 
(209). Townshend first links the Orientalist perversions in William Beckford’s 
Vathek to the more typical Gothic construction of Catholicism as the locus of 
perversion via Lacan and Žižek’s argument that fear of the Other is predicated 
upon its ability to steal the jouissance proscribed by the Symbolic order except 
via the screen of phantasy (209–20). He then offers intriguing and deeply 
researched readings of how some British discourses contemporary with the 
Gothic constructed Catholicism as the perverse Other of regulated, modern, 
Protestant pleasure, while others—most notably utilitarian theory from 
Frances Hutcheson to John Stuart Mill (245–50) but also political economy—
installed in modern British subjects the superegoic injunction to enjoyment 
(i.e., jouissance) theorized by Žižek and historicized by Roy Porter (243–45). 
Ultimately, Townshend argues for Gothics as the “disastrous place of collision” 
(251) between these contradictory injunctions to regulated pleasure and 
perverse jouissance, stressing how “the more radical implications of the 
sublime” (251) as theorized by Edmund Burke and Anna Laetitia Barbauld 
(with her brother John Aikin) aesthetically legitimated readers’ pleasure in the 
perverse enjoyments of Gothic characters like Ambrosio. Again, however, 
Townshend’s argument for Gothic as a site of “collision” among the 
contemporary discourses that he details is too often displaced by tendentious 
interpretation of how both Gothics and these discourses illustrate the theories 
of Lacan and Žižek about desire and othering, as if the common link to these 
psychoanalytic axioms in itself proved Gothics’ historical reconfiguration of 
contemporary discursive material. 
The final two full chapters of Orders of Gothic shift from arguing about how 
Gothics at once illustrate and contest Foucault’s claims in The Order of Things 
and The History of Sexuality about the advent of modern subjectivity, toward 
interpreting the ways Gothics and Lacanian theory supplement and revise 
Foucault’s arguments in Discipline and Punish about the shift from a classical 
regime of the sovereign power to a modern regime of Panoptical discipline. 
Chapter 6 contends that the sovereign power to torture bodies, exemplified in 
Discipline and Punish by the execution of Damiens, persists into Gothics 
despite the predominant ways their narrative structure deploys Panoptical 
discipline, most notably by rehearsing darkness and torture only to expose it 
to light via techniques such as Radcliffe’s explained supernatural. Stressing 
that Joanna Baillie, Barbauld, and Burke all refer to the torture of Damiens as 
an instance of the sublime, Townshend argues—building on the previous 
chapter’s analysis of the sublime’s “radical” tendencies—that Gothics 
aesthetically reconfigure torture for pleasurable consumption by internalizing 
it as a “sublime” and “exquisite” mental/emotional “torture” rather than 
painful bodily violence (278–84). He then interprets this sublime 
internalization of torture in Gothics as an instance of the ways that Lacan’s 
theory of objet petit a as “the inner scrap of the inchoate real, or, in Gothic 
terms, the remainder of the dark classical age that haunts the subject of 
enlightened modernity” (280) captures the complexities of the historical 
transition from punishment to discipline more accurately than Foucault’s 
alleged insistence upon historical rupture (285-289, esp. 285). 
Building on this argument that Gothics’ internalization of torture registers the 
persistence of earlier forms of power into Foucault’s modernity, chapter 7 
offers an alternative gendered history of the Gothic, arguing that while female 
Gothics of the 1790s such as Radcliffe’s “sketch out the modern subject’s 
discursive coordinates” (292), Gothics of “the first two decades of the 
nineteenth century” (308) like Charlotte Dacre’s Zofloya, Frankenstein, and 
Percy Shelley’s Zastrozzi are “more concerned with the unrepresentable excess 
of this discursive schema, with its remainders and stains, its residues and its 
shadows” (292). Invoking Lacanian theories of objet a and “extimacy” as a 
frame for gendering this difference, Townshend argues that these later Gothics 
recuperate the masculine tradition of excess and perverse jouissance typified 
in chapter 5 by Lewis’s The Monk and indeed mount an “assault upon the 
tradition of the female Gothic” (295): “In the male Gothic of The Monk and 
Zofloya, the screen falls away in order to expose the anamorphic blindspot of 
the object petit a, while in the female Gothic of Radcliffe, the screen is drawn 
back into place to cover over, conceal, and screen off the object’s horrors” 
(313). This argument usefully questions “some of the facile gendered 
distinctions so readily applied to Gothic writing” by other critics (294), but 
using Lacanian theory to interpret the (persuasively delineated) difference 
between these two traditions also weirdly distances what Townshend claims as 
a gendered distinction from gender, per se. And by using Lacanian theory to 
describe what is “the real . . . object of interest” in Gothics like Zofloya (291), 
Townshend as often before rather predetermines his conclusion that Gothics 
are doing something to which Foucault’s historicist analytic makes “little more 
than a gestural reference” (308). 
Townshend’s “Afterword” argues that, despite Foucault’s condemnation of 
Freud in The History of Sexuality for institutionalizing “The Repressive 
Hypothesis” and his critique of Lacan’s theory of how the Symbolic order 
relates subjects to power, Lacan’s theory of power is almost more Foucauldian 
than Foucault, because Lacan’s recognition of the Symbolic order as at once 
deploying power and generating its resistant residue accords more than 
Foucault would admit with Foucault’s notorious claim that “[w]here there is 
power, there is resistance.”[2] This is certainly a provocative claim, and an apt 
end to a thoroughly provocative book. However, here as often before, the 
claim depends too much upon replacing Foucault’s terms with Lacan’s, rather 
than weaving them together in the mutually-illuminating Borromean knot that 
Townshend claims tangles up both theories with Gothic writing. 
 
NOTES 
[1]   For example, the statement that “In his notorious romance The Monk 
(1797), Matthew Lewis substitutes the orientalism of Beckford’s romance 
[Vathek] for the heightened Catholic setting of Madrid . . .” (220) should read 
“substitutes the orientalism of Beckford’s romance [Vathek] with” rather than 
“for” “the heightened Catholic setting of Madrid,” since The Monk is set in 
Madrid. Other errors are more irritating than nonsensical, as with the flawed 
agreement in the phrase “Entrusted by her father to the didactic powers of her 
own experience, the Gothic heroines of Radcliffe and Roche” (125) or in 
“manifestation of an long-standing genealogical tradition” (80). 
[2]   Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction, 
trans. Robert Hurley (New York, 1978), 95. 
 
